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1. Introduction
In this study, we examine the relation between managerial ability and the quality of firms' 
information environment. A firm's information environment not only includes financial 
reporting, it also includes market intermediaries, such as analysts (Bushman et al. 2004).0F1 An 
emerging stream of research has identified the role of managerial ability in enhancing financial 
reporting quality. Conceptually, higher ability managers have a better understanding of their 
firms' business (Mahoney 1995; Coff 1997; Demerjian et al. 2012) and use this knowledge to 
inform investors more effectively (Francis et al. 2008; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Baik et al. 
2011; Demerjian et al. 2013; Baik et al. 2017). However, missing from the literature is evidence 
about the impact of managerial ability on a comprehensive measure of firms' information 
environment. Our study seeks to fill this void. 
There are plausible competing arguments and mixed results from prior research on the 
relation between managerial ability and financial reporting disclosure. Prior research argues and 
shows that equity-based compensation incentivizes high ability managers to improve financial 
reporting quality, suggesting a positive relation between managerial ability and the quality of 
firms' forecasts, as well as the market response to these forecasts (Trueman 1986; Milbourn 
1 Among many information channels, Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) argue that private information 
acquisition through analysts is the second most important source of accounting-based information. Beyer et al. (2010) 
decompose firms' quarterly stock return variance to show the relative contribution of information sources. 
Management forecast and earnings pre-announcement (voluntary disclosures) explain 66% of accounting-based 
information and analyst forecasts explain 22% of accounting-based information. 
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2003).1F2 Baik et al. (2011) show that managerial ability is positively related to the frequency and 
accuracy of management earnings forecasts, as well as the market response to these forecasts, 
further supporting a positive relation between managerial ability and the quality of firms' 
information environment. By contrast, extant research supports the notion that higher ability 
managers can impair firms' information environment through opaque financial disclosures 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Bebchuk et al. 2002).2F3 Demerjian et al. (2013) provide somewhat 
mixed evidence about the relation between managerial ability and accruals quality; they show that 
the data envelope analysis (DEA) measure of managerial ability is positively associated with 
accruals quality, but that the media citations proxy for managerial ability is negatively associated 
with accruals quality. 
Previous studies showing a relation between managerial ability and financial disclosures 
only examine specific financial reporting channels (e.g., management forecasts) instead of using 
measures that capture overall disclosure quality. Dechow et al. (2010) highlight that there are many 
aspects of financial reporting that comprise firms' information environment but these different 
aspects of financial reporting are not all positively related to each other. For example, Dechow et 
al. (2010) describe inverse associations between income smoothing, accruals, TLR, and ERCs. 
Prior research on disclosures (Francis et al. 1997; Frankel et al. 1999; Bushee et al. 2003; Brown 
et al. 2015) also documents that there is significant cross-sectional variation in the individual 
channels chosen to provide financial information. Tasker (1998) finds a negative association 
between the informativeness of firms' financial reporting and the likelihood of conference calls. 
                                                          
2 The positive relation between equity incentives and the quality of firms' information environment does not 
preclude the possibility that equity incentives motivate low ability managers. We discuss this issue in more detail 
on pages 8-9. 
3 Relatedly, a Wall Street Journal article indicates that even after new compensation reporting 
rules were implemented in 2006, companies rarely tabulated all of their post-retirement obligations to 
top executives (Schultz and McGinty 2009). 
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Thus, the use of specific disclosure channels in extant research further clouds our understanding 
of the relation between managerial ability and the quality of firms' information environment. In 
sum, the relation between managerial ability and firms' overall information environment remains 
an unresolved question.  
Recognizing various channels and aspects of financial disclosures, Hilary (2006) highlights 
two significant empirical issues when using specific disclosure channels: (i) a potential spurious 
conclusion due to the fact that various disclosure channels may be substitutes or complements; and 
(ii) a potential endogeneity problem due to the challenges of finding adequate instruments. In the 
spirit of Hilary (2006), we use a composite measure to capture the quality of firms' information 
environment, as reflected in analyst following, analyst forecast accuracy, bid-ask spread, and 
trading volume. These measures enable us to capture both formal and informal communication 
channels as well as public information flows that are difficult to measure.3F4 We find additional 
support for our measures in Hilary (2006), who proposes that using summary measures for overall 
disclosure, such as bid-ask spread and trading volume, can overcome empirical issues associated 
with the use of individual disclosure channels.4F5 We therefore believe that this approach will 
provide more complete and convincing evidence on the relation between managerial ability and 
the quality of firms' information environment. 
We follow prior research (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb 2009; Chen, Cheng, and Wang 2011) 
and create a composite measure of firms' information environment (InfoEnv_Index) based on four 
proxies commonly used in accounting and finance research to capture information environment 
quality: (i) bid-ask spread; (ii) trading volume; (iii) analyst following; and (iv) analyst forecast 
                                                          
4 Our tests explicitly control for individual disclosure channels identified in prior research (i.e., management forecast 
likelihood, accrual quality, and income smoothing). 
5 Hilary (2006) tests how labor unions impact overall disclosure, as reflected in measures similar to those we use in 
our study. 
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errors. We use DEA Score as our primary measure of managerial ability, following Demerjian et 
al. (2012), who use data envelope analysis (DEA) to create a measure of manager-specific 
efficiency (i.e., ability). DEA has been utilized in other settings, such as research investigating the 
relation between managerial ability and management earnings forecasts (Baik et al. 2011), 
earnings quality (Demerjian et al. 2013), and income smoothing (Baik et al. 2017). Because 
managerial ability is multi-dimensional and therefore difficult to measure, we supplement our main 
analyses using two alternative measures of managerial ability. Our first alternative measure of 
managerial ability is based on the number of press citations for a CEO over a prior five-year period. 
This measure is consistent with that used in Milbourn (2003), Rajgopal et al. (2006), and Francis 
et al. (2008). The intuition behind the press citation measure is that the press tends to cite more 
talented CEOs.5F6 For our second alternative measure of managerial ability, we follow Rajgopal et 
al. (2006) and use industry-adjusted return on assets during the prior three years of a particular 
CEO's tenure. 
Using a large sample of observations for the period 1993-2010, we find that firms with 
higher ability managers have a higher quality information environment, even after controlling 
for variables known to be associated with information environment such as size, risk, return on 
assets, firm age, growth, and leverage. Importantly, our results are incremental to the inclusion 
in our regression models of individual measures of information quality documented in extant 
research, such as management forecast likelihood (Baik et al. 2011), accruals quality (Demerjian 
et al. 2013), and income smoothing (Baik et al. 2017). These results suggest that less formal 
disclosures from high ability managers impact firms' information environment, thereby 
reinforcing our motivation for using measures of overall disclosure. As highlighted in Francis et 
                                                          
6 We perform additional analyses later in the paper to confirm that most press releases (95%) are either neutral or 
positive in content, which is consistent with Milbourn (2003), Francis et al. (2008), and Baik et al. (2011). 
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al. (2008), it is possible that high ability managers self-select into firms with better information 
environments, thereby increasing the potential that endogeneity in the form of self-selection 
drives our results. To rule out this possibility, we follow Francis et al. (2008) and conduct a 
simultaneous equations analysis. Results from this analysis suggest that self-selection bias does 
not drive our results. 
We discussed earlier that high ability managers have equity incentives to improve their 
firms' information environment. If managers' equity incentives drive their disclosure choices, 
then we expect to observe a more pronounced positive relation between managerial ability and 
the quality of firms' information environment when managers' equity incentives are greater. We 
report that this is indeed the case. That is, we show that the positive relation between managerial 
ability and the quality of firms' information environment increases to a greater extent when 
managers own more shares of their firms' stock and when they have higher levels of stock 
options. 
Our results suggest that greater equity incentives lead managers of higher ability to create 
a better information environment for the firm. To provide confirmatory evidence, we test for the 
effects of corporate governance on the relationship between equity incentives, managerial ability 
and the information environment. We find that weak monitoring amplifies the positive relation 
between managerial ability and information environment, thus providing further support for the 
hypothesis that equity incentives motivate managers of high ability to maintain a better information 
environment.  Thus, firms with weak governance benefit more from managers of high ability with 
regard to information quality.  
 We make several important contributions to the literature. Our study helps to unify prior 
research on the impact of managerial ability on financial disclosures. Prior research provides 
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evidence about specific disclosure channels and does not address the impact of managerial ability 
on firms' broader information environment. Additionally, evidence about the relation between 
managerial ability and accruals quality is somewhat mixed. Thus, extant research does not provide 
conclusive and complete evidence about the relation between managerial ability and financial 
reporting quality, an important aspect of firms' broader information environment. Given that 
analysts and other market intermediaries reflect the net consequences of multiple dimensions of 
corporate disclosure (e.g., voluntary disclosures, mandatory disclosures, and SEC enforcement 
actions), our use of a composite measure for disclosure allows us to draw stronger inferences 
about the relation between managerial ability and firms' overall corporate disclosure. 
Our study also extends the literature that examines determinants of the quality of firms' 
information environment (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Anderson et al. 2009; Baik et al. 
2010; Drake et al. 2015). In particular, our study complements Baik et al. (2010), who report a 
negative relation between managerial ownership and analyst following. Our findings suggest that 
higher managerial ownership coupled with higher ability managers can improve information 
environments. More broadly, our study complements the literature on the relation between a 
manager's personal characteristics and important corporate decisions and outcomes. In particular, 
this literature has documented that a manager's personal characteristics are related to corporate 
policies involving investing and financing decisions (Bertrand and Schoar 2003), executive 
compensation (Milbourn 2003; Rajgopal et al. 2006), voluntary disclosure (Bamber et al. 2010), 
and market returns and firm value (Demerjian et al. 2012). We add to this line of research by 
demonstrating that managerial ability helps to explain cross-sectional variation in the quality of 
firms' information environment. 
Our results have practical implications for investors and boards of directors. Because the 
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quality of firms' information environment impacts the cost of capital (e.g., Easley and O'Hara 
2004), our study has important implications for investors' portfolio choices. Results from our 
study should also be useful to boards in their deliberations about hiring and firing managers. In 
their hiring decisions, for example, boards can expect that candidate managers with high ability 
will also be more transparent and communicative with outside investors. 
Several caveats are in order. First, although we adopt our measures of managerial ability 
from previous studies, we acknowledge that it is difficult to identify an all-encompassing proxy 
for managerial ability because it is not readily observable. Our empirical evidence should therefore 
be interpreted with some caution. Second, our study has a potential sample selection bias. To 
construct our managerial ability measures, we use data from ExecuComp. Because ExecuComp 
focuses on larger firms, our inferences might not generalize to smaller firms. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss literature relevant to our study and 
develop our main empirical prediction. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 provides 
the research design and section 5 contains our main empirical results. We present robustness tests 
in section 6 and additional tests in section 7. Section 8 summarizes and concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
A growing literature involving scholars in accounting, economics, and finance examines 
the impact of managerial characteristics on corporate decisions and outcomes, such as investing 
and financing (Bertrand and Schoar 2003), executive compensation (Milbourn 2003), earnings 
quality (Demerjian et al. 2013), management earnings forecasts (Baik et al. 2011; Bamber et al. 
2010), and income smoothing (Baik et al. 2017). We complement and extend this literature by 
examining the relation between managerial ability and the quality of firms' information 
environment. 
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There are plausible competing arguments for the direction of the relation between 
managerial ability and the quality of firms' information environment. One perspective on this 
relation is that equity-based compensation provides high ability managers with incentives to 
enhance financial reporting, leading to better information environment. Milbourn (2003) reports 
that managerial ability is positively associated with (equity) pay-performance sensitivity, which 
implies that high ability managers receive a substantial amount of equity-based compensation. 
Trueman (1986) theorizes that because the market values information about changes in firms' 
underlying economics, high ability managers' equity-based compensation incentivizes them to 
inform the market about such changes via voluntary earnings forecasts. Relatedly, Baik et al. 
(2011) report that managerial ability is positively related to the likelihood, accuracy, and value 
relevance of voluntary management earnings forecasts. Other recent studies document evidence 
consistent with high ability managers improving their firms' information environment. Demerjian 
et al. (2013) show that earnings quality increases in managerial ability, while Baik et al. (2017) 
report that firms with high ability managers have more predictable earnings. 
While equity incentives potentially motivate low ability managers to improve their firms' 
information environment, it may not be in their interests to do so. Trueman (1986) argues that 
equity incentives motivate high ability managers to provide voluntary management earnings 
forecasts because doing so will increase their firms' stock price and consequently lead to higher 
wealth for managers. A critical assumption of Trueman's (1986) argument is that because of their 
superior skill, high ability managers face a different cost benefit trade-off from disclosure and 
lower ability managers will not follow the same strategy as high ability managers. This argument 
also applies to other individual disclosure channels, such as accrual quality and smoothing, and 
more generally to overall disclosure. 
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A different perspective is that high ability managers increase their payoffs through opaque 
disclosures. Previous studies also argue that entrenched managers could extract a greater 
informational rent through the use opaque financial reporting (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2004; Kalyta and Magnan 2008).  Other studies suggest that strong governance provides 
monitoring over managers and encourages them to improve their firms' information environment 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; 
Bushee and Noe 2000) even though it may not be in the manager’s self-interest. Even after the 
SEC implemented new rules in 2006 that standardized executive compensation disclosures, firms 
continued to provide vague or incomplete disclosures about executive pensions (Schultz and 
McGinty 2009). It is also possible that low ability managers could earn greater informational rents 
through obscure financial reporting, leading to a weaker information environment. 
As we discussed earlier, the use of specific disclosure channels in extant research raises 
significant empirical issues that do not allow us to draw strong conclusions about the impact of 
managerial ability on firms' information environment. Thus, based on theory, conflicting empirical 
evidence, as well as empirical issues associated with using specific disclosure channels, the 
direction of the relation between managerial ability and firms' information environment is an open 
empirical question. The preceding arguments lead to the following hypothesis, stated in the null 
form: 
Hypothesis: There is no relation between managerial ability and the quality of firms' 
information environment. 
3. Sample and Data 
We identify an initial sample of 18,258 firm-year observations from the intersection of 
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ExecuComp/IBES/CRSP databases for the years 1993-2010 to construct managerial ability and 
information environment proxies.6F7 We lose 1,738 firm-year observations after merging this data 
set with the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG), which is required to construct 
management forecast issuance likelihood. Merging our sample with Compustat (for control 
variables) results in the loss of another 1,313 firm-year observations. The final sample consists of 
15,207 firm-year observations. 
We adopt a proxy for managerial ability from Demerjian et al. (2012), who use data 
envelope analysis (DEA) to derive a measure of management-specific ability.7F8 This measure of 
managerial efficiency can be thought of as a performance-based measure of innate managerial 
ability. In validity checks of their measure, Demerjian et al. (2012) find that it is positively 
related to five alternative measures of managerial ability used in prior research: historical 
industry-adjusted stock returns, historical industry-adjusted return-on assets (ROA), CEO 
compensation, CEO tenure, and media mentions. This gives us added comfort that the DEA 
measure is capturing a significant dimension of managerial ability. 
It is difficult to measure directly firms' information environment. This difficulty arises in 
part from the multi-dimensional nature of this construct. We attempt to capture the multi-
dimensional nature of firms' information environment by compiling indexes of firms' information 
environment from multiple measures employed in prior research (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Botosan et al. 2004; Anderson et al. 2009). We use analyst following 
as our first proxy for information environment. We measure analyst following as the natural 
logarithm of the number of analysts following each firm. Analysts serve as an important 
                                                          
7 The sample period ends in 2010 because First Call stopped providing management earnings forecasts after 2010. 
8 We obtain data for the DEA-based measure of managerial ability from Peter Demerjian's web site. For robustness, 
we use press citations and industry-adjusted ROA as alternative measures of managerial ability (Rajgopal et al. 
2006; Francis et al. 2008; Baik et al. 2011). 
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intermediary by conveying information from corporations to investors. Higher analyst coverage 
reflects a more sophisticated information environment and more market scrutiny over corporate 
disclosure. Analyst forecast accuracy is our second proxy for information environment. Analyst 
forecast accuracy reflects the availability of firm information in the capital market. We calculate 
analyst forecast error as the square of the difference between the mean analysts' earnings forecast 
and actual firm earnings divided by the firm's stock price, following Anderson et al. (2009). 
Our third proxy for information environment is trading volume. Prior research shows that 
trading volume captures the quality of information environment in market trades (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000; Lo et al. 2004). We measure trading volume as the average daily dollar trading 
volume (from CRSP) during the fiscal year. We employ bid-ask spread as the fourth proxy for 
information environment. Bid-ask spread is a widely used proxy for information asymmetry 
among investors (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). We measure bid-ask spread using annual mean 
of daily bid-ask spread calculated by ask price minus bid price divided by the average of bid and 
ask prices from CRSP. 
We follow the procedure in Anderson et al. (2009) to create a composite index of 
information environment (InfoEnv_Index) based on the four information environment proxies. For 
each firm, we rank the four information environment proxies (trading volume, bid-ask spread, 
analyst following, and analyst forecast errors) into deciles, in which firms with the most (least) 
information environment have a value of 10 (1). We then sum the four rankings and divide 
them by 40 (total possible points), yielding a measure that ranges between 1 (highest information 
environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). To alleviate the concern 
of artificially assigning equal weights among multiple proxies to construct a composite index, we 
also run factor analyses on the information environment proxies and obtain qualitatively similar 
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results. 
4. Research Design 
To test the relation between information environment and managerial ability, we 
estimate the following OLS model: 
InfoEnv_Index = α + β1 Ability + β2 Size + β3 Risk + β4 Performance + β5 Firm Age  
+ β6 Growth + β7 Leverage + β8 Disclose + β9 Accrual Quality + β10 Smoothing + ε,         (1) 
where InfoEnv_Index is a composite index of information environment, as described above. Recall 
that the InfoEnv_Index ranges between 1 (highest information environment quality) and 0.1 
(lowest information environment quality). Ability is DEA Score based on the measure from 
Demerjian et al. (2012). 
We also include control variables in our regression models that prior research has linked 
to information environment (Bhushan 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan 1990; Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barth et al. 2001; Lim 2001; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; 
Frankel et al. 2006; Anderson et al. 2009). We based the predicted sign (in brackets) for each 
control variable on prior research. In cases where prior research provides ambiguous results, we 
indicate that using a question mark. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets (+). Risk is 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 36 months (-). Performance is 
return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
from the prior year (+). Firm Age is measured as the number of years since the firm first appeared 
on CRSP (?). Growth is firm growth opportunities, measured as research and development 
expenses divided by total assets (R&D Expenses / total assets) (?). Leverage is the firm's debt 
ratio, measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets (-). Disclose is a dummy variable 
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of management forecast likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual management earnings 
forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, following Baik et al. (2011) (+). Accrual Quality is measured using 
a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual model, following Demerjian et al. (2013) (+). For 
easier interpretation, Accrual Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number 
indicates high accrual quality. Smoothing is income smoothing measured by the standard 
deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, where 
earnings and cash flows are scaled by lagged total assets following Baik et al. (2017) (+). For 
easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative one, such that a high number indicates 
high smoothing. All analyses control for firm and year fixed effects. 
 5. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Empirical Results 
 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
        We provide descriptive statistics for our sample in Table 1. InfoEnv_Index has a mean 
(median) of 0.567 (0.575). We also report descriptive statistics for each component of 
InfoEnv_Index. Analyst following has a mean (median) of 11.845 (10.000), analyst forecast error 
has a mean (median) of 0.005 (0.001), trading volume has a mean (median) of 47.664 11.427) 
million dollars, and Bid-Ask Spread has a mean (median) of 0.008 (0.003). The sample firms are 
large and profitable, with mean (median) Size (total assets) of $4.80 ($1.26) billion and mean 
(median) Performance (return on assets) of 5.0% (5.8%). The mean (median) of DEA Score is 
0.018 (0.007). The mean (median) Risk (standard deviation of monthly returns) for our sample is 
0.13 (0.11). The mean (median) firm age is 22.5 (16.0) years, suggesting that our sample consists 
of mature firms. Mean (median) R&D Expenses (Growth) is 4.1% (0.7%) of total assets and mean 
(median) leverage is 17.8% (15.6%) of total assets. On average, 39.7% of sample firms issue 
management forecasts for the year. Most of the variables are fairly well symmetrically distributed, 
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except for Size, both of which have means well in excess of their medians. We account for this 
skewness by using decile rankings in the regression analyses.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
5.2 Pearson Correlations 
In Table 2, we provide Pearson correlations between the variables used in our regression 
analyses. InfoEnv_Index has a significant positive correlation with DEA Score. Consistent with 
previous managerial ability studies, management forecast likelihood and smoothing are positively 
associated with DEA Score. Furthermore, InfoEnv_Index is positively associated with 
management forecast likelihood, accrual quality, and smoothing. These correlations indicate the 
need of controlling management forecast likelihood, accrual quality, and smoothing in our 
regression model as we do in model (1). We find similar results using Spearman correlations 
(untabulated). Although none of the correlations appears large enough to cause collinearity 
concerns, we nevertheless formally test for collinearity in our regression analyses.8F9 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
5.3 Regression Results for Managerial Ability and Information Environment 
We provide regression results for the relation between information environment and 
managerial ability in Table 3. After controlling for firm characteristics that have been shown to 
affect firms' information environment, we report a significant coefficient of 0.056 (p <0.01) on 
DEA Score, which supports our hypothesis of a positive association between managerial ability 
and firms' information environment. These results suggest that high ability managers provide 
                                                          
9 VIFs in the regressions do not exceed 2 (untabulated), suggesting that collinearity problems do not likely impact 
our results. 
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information that enhances firms' overall information environment incremental to that provided by 
individual disclosure channels, such as management forecasts, accrual quality, and smoothing. 
Our results thus support the use of summary disclosure measures to capture overall disclosure 
attributable to high ability managers. Results for the control variables are consistent with those 
found in prior research. We next assess the economic significance of these results. Moving from 
the third decile to the eighth decile of DEA Score increases the InfoEnv_Index by 13.7% of the 
standard deviation of InfoEnv_Index. Thus, the results in Table 3 are economically, as well as 
statistically, significant. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 For robustness, we use each component of InfoEnv_Index as a dependent variable and 
rerun model (1). Results reported in Table 3 show positive coefficients on DEA Score when the 
dependent variable is Analyst Following and Trading Volume, and significantly negative 
coefficients when the dependent variable is Analyst Forecast Error and Bid-Ask Spread, consistent 
with managerial ability improving information environment. These results corroborate those 
obtained using InfoEnv_Index. 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
6.1 Self-Selection Test 
As highlighted in Francis et al. (2008), it is possible that firms with higher quality 
information environments employ higher ability managers. If so, then this suggests that self-
selection might drive our results. However, Francis et al. (2008) provide evidence that firms with 
lower quality information environments employ higher ability managers to improve their 
information environment. This evidence notwithstanding, we follow Francis et al. (2008) and 
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perform a simultaneous equations analysis to rule out the possibility that self-selection drives our 
results. We use model (1) as a determinant model of firms' information environment and use the 
following model (2) as a determinant model of managerial ability, following Himmelberg and 
Hubbard (2000) and Francis et al. (2008): 
Ability = α + β1 InfoEnv_Index + β2 Size + β3 Market to Book + β4 Current Returns  
+ β5 Past Returns + β6 Current ROA + β7 Tenure + β8 Age Dummy + β9 Age Dummy * Age  
+ β10 R&D Dummy + β11 R&D Dummy * R&D + β12 Advertising Dummy  
+ β13 Advertising Dummy * Advertising + ε,        (2) 
 
where Ability, InfoEnv_Index, and Size are defined in model (1). We include three firm 
performance measures: Current Returns, Current Returns, and Current ROA. Current Returns is 
current year's market returns. Past Returns is last year's market returns. Current ROA is return on 
assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets of current year. We 
include three intangible intensity using the market-to-book ratio, research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, and advertising expenditures. Market to Book is the market to book ratio measured 
by market value of common equity divided by book value of equity. R&D is measured as research 
and development expenses divided by sales. Advertising is measured as advertising expenses 
divided by sales. Because many firms do not report R&D and advertising expenditures, we include 
a reporting dummy variable to address this issue. R&D Dummy equals 1 if a value for R&D is 
reported on Compustat, and 0 otherwise. Advertising Dummy equals 1 if a value for advertising is 
reported on Compustat, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we include CEO characteristics such as CEO 
tenure and CEO age. Tenure is the number of years that a CEO has the CEO position. Age is a 
CEO's age. Age Dummy is set to 1 if an age value is reported on ExecuComp, and 0 otherwise. 
We report in Table 4 that InfoEnv_Index is positively related to managerial ability, even 
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after controlling for simultaneous equations. This result is consistent with results in Table 3. Thus, 
self-selection bias does not appear to drive our main results. The first stage determinant models of 
managerial ability and information environment have an R2 of 0.712 and 0.846, respectively, 
indicating substantial explanatory power of our instruments. Weak instrument tests further show 
that the minimum eigenvalue statistics of 167.10 and 57.90 exceed thresholds established in Stock 
and Yogo (2005), thereby rejecting the null hypothesis that our instruments are weak. Finally, the 
Hausman (1978) test statistics reported in Table 4 also support the need to control endogeneity 
through simultaneous equations. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
6.2 Alternative Measures of Managerial Ability 
 To provide additional support for our results, we next assess the robustness of our main 
results based on two alternative measures of managerial ability. We follow Rajgopal et al. (2006) 
and use industry-adjusted ROA (IndAdjROA) for the prior three years for a particular CEO for each 
firm-year as our first alternative measure of managerial ability. We construct IndAdjROA using 
income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets for each firm and subtract from it 
the median ROA for firms with the same two-digit SIC code for each firm-year. 
For our second alternative measure of managerial ability, we follow Milbourn (2003), 
Rajgopal et al. (2006), and Francis et al. (2008), and use CEO press citations. The intuition behind 
this measure is that a CEO who is perceived to be an expert is more likely to be interviewed and 
cited than a CEO who is not considered to be an expert. Thus, the press citation measure of CEO 
ability likely reflects the market's assessment of a CEO's perceived ability (Milbourn 2003). 
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Similar to research employing press citations as a proxy for managerial ability, we hand-collect 
CEOs' press citations by searching news articles from all publications in the Factiva database. We 
code the number of news articles that mention the CEO's name and company. For each sample 
year, we sum the number of citations over the prior five years to measure ability because it is 
reasonable to assume that a CEO develops his/her ability over a number of years. 
Although the press citation measure has been employed in published research (e.g., Francis 
et al. 2008), we nevertheless perform a validation test of this measure similar to that performed in 
prior research. A key assumption linking press citations and CEO ability is that, compared to CEOs 
of low repute, the press is more likely to cite CEOs of high repute. It could be the case, however, 
that the tone of the articles might be negative, thus negating the underlying reason for using the 
number of news articles. To mitigate this concern, we randomly select 100 CEOs in our sample and 
randomly choose 10 news articles for each of these CEOs. We then examine these articles, noting 
their tone. We find that 95% of the articles portray CEOs in neutral (75%) or positive tones (20%) 
(untabulated), thus validating press citations as a reasonable proxy of ability without considering 
the specific content of the articles. The results of our validation tests are consistent with those 
reported in prior research (Milbourn 2003; Rajgopal et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2008). In untabulated 
results, we find that our main inferences are unaffected using industry-adjusted ROA and press 
citations as alternative measures of managerial ability. 
 7. Additional Tests 
 7.1 Equity Incentives 
As we argued earlier, if equity incentives influence managers' disclosure choices, then we 
expect to observe a more pronounced relation between managerial ability and firms' information 
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environment when managers' equity incentives are greater. We argue that equity-based 
compensation provides high ability managers with incentives to enhance financial reporting 
(Milbourn 2003). Improving the information environment through disclosure quality is related to 
lower cost of capital, which affects firm value (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Botosan 1997; Leuz 
and Verrecchia 2000; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2002; Easley and O'Hara 2004) and, 
consequently, managers' wealth. However, because high ability managers might prefer rent 
extraction under an agency problem of partial ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Bebchuk et 
al. 2002), rent extraction incentives might dominate equity incentives. 
We use two measures of equity incentives. For our first measure of equity incentives, we 
use CEO stock ownership, measured as percentage of shares outstanding held by the CEO. Prior 
research suggests that CEO stock ownership provides equity incentives to reduce agency costs 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ang et al. 2000). For our second measure of equity incentives, we use 
CEO firm-related wealth, measured as the sum of the value of employee stock options exercisable 
and unexercisable options) and the value of stock shares owned, scaled by firm market value. 
Employee stock options are typically excluded when measuring ownership, but we include them 
because CEOs' compensation structure typically includes significant portions of option-based 
compensation, thus providing CEOs with additional equity incentives.9F10 
Table 5 provides regression results for tests investigating how equity incentives affect the 
relation between managerial ability and information environment. We interact DEA Score and 
equity incentives (Ownership and Wealth) to examine whether equity incentives increase the 
                                                          
10 We compute the value of stock options based on the Black-Scholes formula, following Core and Guay (2002), Coles 
et al. (2006), and Daniel et al. (2016). We use the approximation method to determine vested and unvested option 
shares for the pre-2006 data and we use the disclosed number of option shares (vested and unvested) for data in the 
subsequent period, following Coles et al (2013). 
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positive effect of managerial ability on information environment. In Table 5, we report that the 
coefficients on DEA Score*Ownership and DEA Score*Wealth are significantly positive (p<0.01 
for both). Overall, the results in Table 5 corroborate our main results and suggest that managers 
with higher equity incentives improve firms' information environment even more compared to 
managers with lower equity incentives. These additional results support our argument that equity 
incentives incentivize high ability managers to enhance their firms' information environment 
through improved financial reporting. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
7.2 Rent Extraction Incentives 
Results thus far indicate that firms' information environment is increasing in managerial 
ability and that equity incentives drive this result. However, even though equity incentives appear 
to dominate rent extraction incentives, on average, these results do not exclude the possibility that 
both equity and rent extraction incentives impact information environment quality. Strong 
corporate governance mechanisms can restrain rent extraction incentives (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999) of hiding excessive compensation through opaque 
disclosures (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Schultz and McGinty 2009). We therefore examine whether 
rent extraction incentives lead higher ability managers to reduce the quality of their firms' 
information environment quality when corporate governance is weak. If high ability managers do 
not do so, even under weak corporate governance, then this would corroborate our prior findings 
and add further support to the equity incentive story. 
We employ two widely used measures of governance to study their influence on the 
relation between managerial ability and the information environment. For our first measure of 
governance, we use dedicated institutional ownership, which Bushee (1998) defines as long-term 
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buy-and-hold investors that are expected to provide more stringent oversight than short-term 
investors. We measure dedicated institutional ownership as the percentage of shares held by 
dedicated institutional investors.10F11 For our second governance measure, we use board of director 
independence, measured as the proportion of board members who have no affiliation with the firm 
other than as directors. Independent directors are expected to provide better oversight than non-
independent directors (Fama 1980). 
Table 6 provides regression results for tests of the relation between managerial ability 
and our two measures of a firm's governance environment. We interact DEA Score and 
corporate governance, measured as dedicated institutional ownership and the independence 
of directors, to examine whether governance affects the relation between managerial ability 
and firms' information environment. In Table 6, we report that the coefficients on DEA 
Score*Dedicated Institutional Ownership and DEA Score*Independent Director% are 
significantly negative (p<0.05 for both). Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that given the 
opportunity to extract rent, high ability managers are less likely to do so compared to low ability 
managers. These results corroborate our prior findings and add further support to an equity 
incentive story that explains why firms with high ability managers have better information 
environments. The results also suggest that high ability managers play a relatively more important 
role in improving the information environment in firms with weak governance than in firms with 
strong governance. Results from this sub-section thus highlight that managerial ability serves as 
an effective alternative monitoring mechanism when firms' governance mechanisms are weak. 
                                                          
11 See Bushee (1998) for details on the categorization of institutional owners. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
8. Summary and Conclusion 
This study examines the relation between managerial ability and the quality of firms' 
information environment. There are competing predictions for the existence and direction of the 
relation between managerial ability and information environment, as well as empirical issues that 
leave our understanding of the relation between managerial ability and information environment 
incomplete. Using a large sample of firms over the period 1993-2010 and multiple measures of 
firms' information environment, we find a positive and economically significant relation between 
managerial ability and firms' information environment. This evidence is consistent with the notion 
that overall disclosure in firms with high ability managers is such that it effectively enhances firms' 
information environment. As in prior studies of managerial ability and financial reporting (e.g., 
Francis et al. 2008), self-selection bias potentially impacts our results. However, we rule out this 
possibility via simultaneous equations tests. Our results are also robust to using alternative 
measures of managerial ability. 
We also investigate whether equity-based incentives explain our main results and show 
that higher levels of managerial stock ownership and firm-related wealth do indeed provide high 
ability managers with incentives to improve their firms' information environment. Further 
corroborating the equity incentive story, we also show that higher ability managers enhance 
firms' information environment more than lower ability managers when firms have a relatively 
weak governance environment (i.e., when managers are entrenched), as reflected in low 
dedicated institutional ownership and low board independence. These results imply that high 
ability managers prefer a better information environment even if there is weak governance within 
the firm.  
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 Because managerial ability is difficult to observe directly, results from our study are based 
on proxies that may embody errors. Notwithstanding this caveat, our study helps to unify prior 
conflicting research on the question of the impact of managerial ability on information 
environment. Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on the role of managerial ability 
as an economic factor affecting firm outcomes. Results from our study should be useful to boards 
of directors in their hiring and retention decisions, as well as to investors for portfolio decisions. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
InfoEnv_Index   15,207 0.567 0.205 0.425 0.575 0.725 
Analyst Following 15,207 11.845 7.269 6.000 10.000 16.000 
Analyst Forecast Error 15,207 0.005 0.034 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Trading Volume 15,207 47.664 103.075 3.654 11.427 38.557 
Bid-Ask Spread 15,207 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.011 
DEA Score 15,207 0.018 0.133 -0.069 0.007 0.094 
Size 15,207 4,804.6 10,274.8 478.0 1,257.5 3,861.2 
Risk 15,207 0.126 0.062 0.082 0.111 0.153 
Performance 15,207 0.050 0.096 0.024 0.058 0.096 
Firm Age 15,207 22.507 19.021 9.000 16.000 32.000 
Growth 15,207 0.041 0.067 0.000 0.007 0.057 
Leverage 15,207 0.178 0.163 0.018 0.156 0.281 
Disclose 15,207 0.397 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Accrual Quality 15,207 -0.036 0.049 -0.044 -0.023 -0.010 
Smoothing 15,207 -1.148 1.560 -1.318 -0.829 -0.505 
This Table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses. InfoEnv_Index is 
a composite index of information environment, measured by ranking the four individual proxies for information 
environment (trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst forecast errors) into deciles in 
which firms with the highest information environment have a value of 10. The four rankings are then summed 
and divided by 40 (total possible points), yielding a measure that ranges between 1 (highest information 
environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). Analyst Following is the number of 
analysts providing earnings per share estimates nine months prior to fiscal year-end. Analyst Forecast Error is 
the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts’ earnings forecast (nine months prior to fiscal 
year-end) and actual firm earnings scaled by the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Trading 
Volume is the average daily trading volume (in $million) over the fiscal year. Bid-Ask Spread is measured as 
the ask price minus the bid price divided by average of the bid and ask prices. DEA Score is our proxy for 
managerial ability and is based on the measure developed in Demerjian et al. (2012). Size is firm size, measured 
using total assets (in $million). Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 36 
months. Performance is return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets from the prior year. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on CRSP. Growth 
is firm growth opportunities, measured as research and development expenses divided by total assets (R&D 
Expenses / total assets). Leverage is firm leverage, measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Disclose is a dummy variable of management forecast likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual management 
earnings forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, following Baik et al. (2011). Accrual Quality is measured using a 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual model, following Demerjian et al. (2013). For easier interpretation, 
Accrual Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number indicates high accrual quality. 
Smoothing is income smoothing measured by the standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled by lagged total assets 
following Baik et al (2017). For easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a 
high number indicates high smoothing. 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlations between Variables 
 
 InfoEnv_Index 
DEA 
Score Size Risk Performance Frim Age Growth Leverage Disclose 
Accrual 
Quality Smoothing 
InfoEnv_Index 1.000 0.125 0.615 -0.256 0.250 0.168 0.077 -0.049 0.251 0.076 0.022 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.006 
DEA Score   1.000 -0.011 -0.101 0.328 -0.021 -0.082 -0.097 0.030 0.012 0.129 
     0.180 <.0001 <.0001 0.009 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.128 <.0001 
Size     1.000 -0.407 -0.051 0.445 -0.145 0.348 0.162 0.145 0.031 
       <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 
Risk       1.000 -0.254 -0.386 0.188 -0.117 -0.136 -0.237 -0.223 
         <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Performance         1.000 0.015 0.002 -0.319 0.103 0.081 0.199 
           0.068 0.788 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Frim Age           1.000 -0.052 0.152 0.055 0.135 0.050 
             <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Growth             1.000 -0.302 -0.040 -0.143 -0.229 
               <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Leverage               1.000 0.042 0.093 -0.021 
                 <.0001 <.0001 0.010 
Disclose                 1.000 0.092 0.086 
                   <.0001 <.0001 
Accrual Quality                   1.000 0.178 
                     <.0001 
Smoothing                     1.000 
                       
This Table reports the Pearson correlations between the variables used in the regression analyses. InfoEnv_Index is a composite index of information 
environment, measured by ranking the four individual proxies for information environment (trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst 
forecast errors) into deciles in which firms with the highest information environment have a value of 10. The four rankings are then summed and divided by 40 
(total possible points), yielding a measure that ranges between 1 (highest information environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). 
DEA Score is our proxy for managerial ability and is based on the measure developed in Demerjian et al. (2012). Size is firm size, measured using total assets (in 
$million). Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 36 months. Performance is return on assets, measured as income before 
extraordinary items divided by average total assets from the prior year. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on CRSP. Growth is firm 
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growth opportunities, measured as research and development expenses divided by total assets (R&D Expenses / total assets). Leverage is firm leverage, 
measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets. Disclose is a dummy variable of management forecast likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual 
management earnings forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, following Baik et al. (2011). Accrual Quality is measured using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
accrual model, following Demerjian et al. (2013). For easier interpretation, Accrual Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number indicates 
high accrual quality. Smoothing is income smoothing measured by the standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled by lagged total assets following Baik et al (2017). For easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by 
negative one to indicate that a high number indicates high smoothing. 
 
32 
 
Table 3 
Regressions of Information Environment Measures on Managerial Ability 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
InfoEnv_ 
Index 
Analyst 
Following 
Analyst 
Forecast 
Error 
Trading 
Volume 
Bid-Ask 
Spread 
DEA Score  0.056*** 0.016** -0.065*** 0.091*** -0.052*** 
  [12.19] [2.37] [-5.55] [17.67] [-10.39] 
Size + 0.479*** 0.671*** -0.269*** 0.668*** -0.307*** 
  [45.44] [42.86] [-10.12] [56.48] [-26.53] 
Risk - -0.006 -0.001 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.036*** 
  [-1.11] [-0.11] [7.46] [18.48] [5.66] 
Performance + 0.115*** 0.095*** -0.138*** 0.146*** -0.082*** 
  [27.29] [15.06] [-12.98] [30.78] [-17.75] 
Frim Age ? -0.034** 0.075*** 0.023 -0.110*** 0.076*** 
  [-2.46] [3.71] [0.68] [-7.19] [5.08] 
Growth ? -0.031** -0.006 0.133*** 0.019 0.004 
  [-1.97] [-0.25] [3.36] [1.10] [0.23] 
Leverage - -0.038*** -0.044*** 0.050*** -0.036*** 0.021*** 
  [-7.38] [-5.79] [3.86] [-6.32] [3.72] 
Disclose + 0.018*** 0.013*** -0.040*** 0.017*** -0.002 
  [7.69] [3.62] [-6.80] [6.43] [-0.92] 
Accrual Quality + 0.013*** 0.018*** -0.028*** -0.002 -0.005 
  [3.83] [3.76] [-3.42] [-0.43] [-1.47] 
Smoothing + 0.015*** 0.011* -0.034*** 0.003 -0.014*** 
  [4.10] [1.89] [-3.61] [0.69] [-3.37] 
Constant  0.537*** 0.784*** 0.526*** 0.467*** 0.776*** 
  [89.15] [87.60] [34.61] [68.91] [117.46] 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 
R-squared  0.819 0.802 0.406 0.881 0.884 
This Table reports the regression results for an association between InfoEnv_Index and DEA Scores. InfoEnv_Index is a 
composite index of information environment, measured by ranking the four individual proxies for information environment 
(trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst forecast errors) into deciles in which firms with the highest 
information environment have a value of 10. The four rankings are then summed and divided by 40 (total possible points), yielding 
a measure that ranges between 1 (highest information environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). 
Analyst Following is the number of analysts providing earnings per share estimates nine months prior to fiscal year-end. Analyst 
Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts’ earnings forecast (nine months prior to fiscal 
year-end) and actual firm earnings scaled by the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Trading Volume is the 
average daily trading volume (in $million) over the fiscal year. Bid-Ask Spread is measured as the ask price minus the bid price 
divided by average of the bid and ask prices. DEA Score is our proxy for managerial ability and is based on the measure developed 
in Demerjian et al. (2012). Size is firm size, measured using total assets (in $million). Risk is the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns for the previous 36 months. Performance is return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided 
by average total assets from the prior year. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on CRSP. Growth is 
firm growth opportunities, measured as research and development expenses divided by total assets (R&D Expenses / total assets). 
Leverage is firm leverage, measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets. Disclose is a dummy variable of management 
forecast likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual management earnings forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, following (Baik et al. 
2011). Accrual Quality is measured using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual model, following Demerjian et al. 
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(2013). For easier interpretation, Accrual Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number indicates high 
accrual quality. Smoothing is income smoothing measured by the standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation 
of cash flows from operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled by lagged total assets following Baik et al (2017). For 
easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number indicates high smoothing. Continuous 
variables are ranked by deciles and divided by 10 for comparability with the InfoEnv_Index. ***, **, * indicates significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Simultaneous Equations Analysis  
of Information Environment and Managerial Ability 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign DV: DEA Score DV: InfoEnv_Index 
DEA Score   0.363*** 
   [25.64] 
Size -, + -0.329*** 0.443*** 
  [-6.30] [37.55] 
Risk -  0.005 
   [0.81] 
Performance +  0.052*** 
   [9.61] 
Firm Age ?  -0.000 
   [-0.01] 
Growth ?  -0.119*** 
   [-6.79] 
Leverage -  -0.027*** 
   [-4.73] 
Disclose +  0.012*** 
   [4.50] 
Accrual Quality +  0.013*** 
   [3.77] 
Smoothing +  0.005 
   [1.10] 
InfoEnv_Index  0.957***  
  [10.37]  
Market to Book  -0.072***  
  [-3.80]  
Current Returns  0.073***  
  [6.58]  
Past Returns  0.042***  
  [6.22]  
Current ROA  0.200***  
  [16.38]  
Tenure  -0.030***  
  [-3.57]  
Age Dummy  -0.015**  
  [-2.38]  
Age Dummy * Age  0.035***  
  [3.37]  
R&D Dummy  -0.030**  
  [-2.48]  
R&D Dummy * R&D  -0.000  
  [-0.01]  
Advertising Dummy  0.025**  
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  [2.12]  
Advertising Dummy  
* Advertising 
 -0.117***  
 [-2.62]  
Constant  -0.679*** 0.540*** 
  [-9.94] [18.59] 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations  14,563 14,563 
1st Stage R-squared  0.712 0.846 
2nd Stage R-squared  0.763 0.637 
Weak instrument test 
 167.10 
(5% bias: 20.90) 
(10% size: 40.90) 
57.90 
(5% bias: 20.25) 
(10% size: 33.84) 
Hausman test  F=662.86 (p<0.01) 
F=101.85 
(p<0.01) 
 
This Table reports results from a simultaneous equations analysis for an association between InfoEnv_Index and DEA 
Score. InfoEnv_Index is a composite index of information environment, measured by ranking the four individual 
proxies for information environment (trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst forecast errors) 
into deciles in which firms with the highest information environment have a value of 10. The four rankings are then 
summed and divided by 40 (total possible points), yielding a measure that ranges between 1 (highest information 
environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). DEA Score is our proxy for managerial ability 
and is based on the measure developed in Demerjian et al. (2012). Size is firm size, measured using total assets (in 
$million). Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 36 months. Performance is return 
on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets from the prior year. Firm 
Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on CRSP. Growth is firm growth opportunities, measured as 
research and development expenses divided by total assets (R&D Expenses / total assets). Leverage is firm leverage, 
measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets. Disclose is a dummy variable of management forecast 
likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual management earnings forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, following Baik et 
al. (2011). Accrual Quality is measured using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual model, following 
Demerjian et al. (2013).  For easier interpretation, Accrual Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high 
number indicates high accrual quality. Smoothing is income smoothing measured by the standard deviation of 
earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled 
by lagged total assets, following Baik et al (2017). For easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative one 
to indicate that a high number indicates high smoothing. Market to Book is the market to book ratio, measured by 
market value of common equity divided by book value of equity. Current Returns is current year’s market returns. 
Past Returns is last year’s market returns. Current ROA is return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets of current year. Tenure is the number of years that a CEO has held the CEO position. 
Age Dummy is set to 1 if an age value is reported on ExecuComp, and 0 otherwise. Age is a CEO’s age. R&D Dummy 
is set to 1 if a R&D value is reported on Compustat, and 0 otherwise. R&D is measured as research and development 
expenses divided by sales. Advertising Dummy is set to 1 if an advertising value is reported on Compustat, and 0 
otherwise. Advertising is measured as advertising expenses divided by sales. Continuous variables are ranked by 
deciles and divided by 10 for comparability with the InfoEnv_Index. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Impact of Managerial Equity Incentives on the Relation between  
Information Environment and Managerial Ability 
 
Dependent  
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
InfoEnv_Index InfoEnv_Index 
DEA Score  0.059*** 0.053*** 
  [12.56] [11.02] 
DEA Score * Ownership  0.040***  
  [3.18]  
Ownership  -0.001  
  [-0.11]  
DEA Score * Wealth   0.055*** 
   [4.07] 
Wealth   0.002 
   [0.31] 
Size + 0.477*** 0.480*** 
  [45.20] [43.65] 
Risk - -0.006 -0.007 
  [-1.12] [-1.17] 
Performance + 0.115*** 0.115*** 
  [27.27] [26.24] 
Firm Age ? -0.032** -0.036*** 
  [-2.36] [-2.59] 
Growth ? -0.030* -0.032** 
  [-1.92] [-1.97] 
Leverage - -0.038*** -0.040*** 
  [-7.39] [-7.48] 
Disclose + 0.018*** 0.017*** 
  [7.65] [7.15] 
Accrual Quality + 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  [3.83] [3.93] 
Smoothing + 0.015*** 0.016*** 
  [4.02] [4.02] 
Constant  0.536*** 0.534*** 
  [88.95] [86.23] 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations  15,025 14,002 
R-squared  0.820 0.822 
This Table assesses how the relation between managerial ability and information environment varies with equity 
incentives, proxied by CEO stock ownership and firm-related wealth. Ownership is the number of shares held by the 
CEO scaled by total shares outstanding. Wealth is the sum of estimated option value (unexercised exercisable and 
unexercisable options) and the value of stock shares owned excluding options, scaled by the value of total shares 
outstanding. InfoEnv_Index is a composite index of information environment, measured by ranking the four 
individual proxies for information environment (trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst 
forecast errors) into deciles in which firms with the highest information environment have a value of 10. The four 
rankings are then summed and divided by 40 (total possible points), yielding a measure that ranges between 1 (highest 
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information environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). DEA Score is our proxy for 
managerial ability and is based on the measure developed in Demerjian et al. (2012). Size is firm size, measured using 
total assets (in $million). Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 36 months. 
Performance is return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets from 
the prior year. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on CRSP. Growth is firm growth 
opportunities, measured as research and development expenses divided by total assets (R&D Expenses / total assets). 
Leverage is firm leverage, measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets. Disclose is a dummy variable of 
management forecast likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual management earnings forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, 
following Baik et al. (2011). Accrual Quality is measured using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual model, 
following Demerjian et al. (2013).  For easier interpretation, Accrual Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate 
that a high number indicates high accrual quality. Smoothing is income smoothing measured by the standard deviation 
of earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled 
by lagged total assets following Baik et al (2017). For easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative one 
to indicate that a high number indicates high smoothing. For easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative 
one to indicate that a high number indicates high smoothing. Continuous variables are ranked by deciles and divided 
by 10 for comparability with the InfoEnv_Index. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Impact of Monitoring on the Relation between  
Information Environment and Managerial Ability  
Dependent  
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
InfoEnv_Index InfoEnv_Index 
DEA Score  0.055*** 0.059*** 
  [11.87] [11.09] 
DEA Score *  
Dedicated Institutional Ownership 
 -0.027**  
 [-2.27]  
Dedicated Institutional Ownership  0.001  
 [0.20]  
DEA Score * Independent Director%   -0.029** 
  [-2.15] 
Independent Director%   0.011* 
   [1.95] 
Size + 0.477*** 0.412*** 
  [45.19] [31.28] 
Risk - -0.006 0.000 
  [-1.08] [0.03] 
Performance + 0.115*** 0.097*** 
  [27.30] [20.08] 
Firm Age ? -0.033** -0.060*** 
  [-2.44] [-3.41] 
Growth ? -0.030* -0.026 
  [-1.94] [-1.44] 
Leverage - -0.038*** -0.030*** 
  [-7.40] [-5.10] 
Disclose + 0.018*** 0.016*** 
  [7.71] [6.41] 
Accrual Quality + 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  [3.86] [3.73] 
Smoothing + 0.015*** 0.011*** 
  [4.08] [2.59] 
Constant  0.537*** 0.656*** 
  [88.91] [153.67] 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations  15,027 11,356 
R-squared  0.820 0.839 
 
This Table assesses how the relation between managerial ability and information environment varies with firms’ 
monitoring, proxied by institutional ownership and independent director composition. Dedicated Institutional 
Ownership is the percentage of shares held by dedicated institutional investors (see Bushee (1998) for details on 
the categorization of institutional ownership), divided by shares outstanding. Independent Director% is the 
percentage of the board of directors that is comprised of members who have no affiliation with the firm except as 
a director. InfoEnv_Index is a composite index of information environment, measured by ranking the four 
individual proxies for information environment (trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst 
forecast errors) into deciles in which firms with the highest information environment have a value of 10. The four 
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rankings are then summed and divided by 40 (total possible points), yielding a measure that ranges between 1 
(highest information environment quality) and 0.1 (lowest information environment quality). DEA Score is our 
proxy for managerial ability and is based on the measure developed in Demerjian et al. (2012). Size is firm size, 
measured using total assets (in $million). Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 
36 months. Performance is return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets from the prior year. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on CRSP. Growth 
is firm growth opportunities, measured as research and development expenses divided by total assets (R&D 
Expenses / total assets). Leverage is firm leverage, measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Disclose is a dummy variable of management forecast likelihood set equal to 1 if there is an annual management 
earnings forecast in year t, 0 otherwise, following Baik et al. (2011). Accrual Quality is measured using a modified 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual model, following Demerjian et al. (2013). For easier interpretation, Accrual 
Quality is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number indicates high accrual quality. Smoothing is 
income smoothing measured by the standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flows 
from operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled by lagged total assets following Baik et al (2017). For 
easier interpretation, Smoothing is multiplied by negative one to indicate that a high number indicates high 
smoothing. Continuous variables are ranked by deciles and divided by 10 for comparability with the 
InfoEnv_Index. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
